Expert Witness Journal Issue 68 August 2026 - Flipbook - Page 52
Did you miss? Pridewell
Properties (London) Ltd v Spirit
Pub Company (Managed) Ltd
by Lina Mattsson, Barrister at Gatehouse Chambers.
On the timing point Fancourt J held that the trial
judge had asked himself the wrong question. The
judge had assessed whether a 10–14 month delay
was reasonable in the circumstances — essentially,
whether it was justi昀椀ed or excusable given the
practical constraints the landlord faced. That is
not what the statute requires. Fancourt J traced the
case law carefully. The Court of Appeal in Reohorn
v Barry Corporation [1956] had established that a
landlord need not have contractors on site the day
after possession — some modest delay is tolerated.
But the language used was deliberate: “… it means
… that the work will begin, not at any long delayed
time, but on the termination of the tenancy.”
Pridewell Properties (London) Ltd v Spirit Pub
Company (Managed) Ltd [2026] EWHC 953 (Ch)
- Mr Justice Fancourt - 24 April 2026
The facts
Lina Mattsson, led by Mark Warwick KC, acted for
the Appellant landlord, a single-purpose vehicle
formed to redevelop The Railway Bell, a public
house. Its scheme involved building three mews
houses in the beer garden and converting the upper
昀氀oors to 昀氀ats. Planning permission had not yet been
obtained as the landlord needed to carry out acoustic
surveys and intrusive structural investigations
before the application could be submitted to the
Local Authority. The lease did not include any
such access rights and the tenant refused access.
Expert witnesses agreed that in the circumstances a
realistic timeline to the start of construction was 10
to 14 months from the possession date.
Fancourt J also clari昀椀ed what Jay J had actually
decided in S Franses Ltd v Cavendish Hotel (London)
Ltd [2017]. That decision was not authority for a
broad “reasonableness” test. Jay J had in mind two
distinct questions: how long was the delay likely to
be, and could that delay properly be described as
within the statutory tolerance — not whether the
delay was excusable.
HHJ Hellman sitting in the Mayor’s and City of
London Court held (amongst other things) that
this was a “reasonable time” and that the ground
of opposition was therefore satis昀椀ed on the timing
point, but held that ground (f) was not satis昀椀ed
on the “narrow ground” that the landlord had
not shown that it had a real prospect of obtaining
funding for the development. The landlord
appealed and the tenant put in a Respondent Notice
which challenged, amongst other things, the judge’s
昀椀nding on the timing point – an issue of wider legal
signi昀椀cance.
Fancourt J held that the statutory tolerance exists to
accommodate the modest practical steps needed to
mobilise once possession is obtained: securing and
clearing the property, getting contractors on site,
and so on. It does not accommodate a landlord that
cannot yet set about the works because something
else must be achieved 昀椀rst. If a landlord intends to set
about works immediately on recovering possession,
it satis昀椀es the test — even if there is some short delay
before the 昀椀rst tool is lifted. The fact that the prior
step was outside the landlord’s control, or caused
by the tenant’s lawful refusal to permit access, is
irrelevant. That is simply the consequence of the
parties’ bargain.
The appeal
Fancourt J held that the trial judge had not erred
when holding that the landlord had not established
that it had a real prospect of obtaining funding
for the development. That issue disposed of the
appeal. Fancourt J, noting the wider importance of
the timing point proceeded to consider the tenant’s
grounds in the Respondent Notice, albeit on the
basis that those grounds were obiter dictum.
EXPERT WITNESS JOURNAL
Applied to the facts: the landlord could not even
submit a planning application until post-possession
surveys were complete. It intended to apply for a
contentious planning permission six or seven months
50
AUGUST 2026
